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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant
to the Utah Constitution, article VIII, section 3, and Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) •
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in concluding that the

plaintiff, Olson, was entitled to contribution from defendant
Park?
On appeal from a summary judgment this Court resolves
only legal issues and does not defer to the trial court's rulings.
It determines only whether the trial court correctly held that
there were no genuine issues of material fact and whether the
trial court erred in applying the governing law to the facts.
Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989).
2.

If Olson was entitled to contribution from Park,

did the trial court err in calculating the amount of contribution
to which Olson was entitled?
This is a question of law which the Court reviews tor
correctness. See Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989);
Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., Inc., 319 N.C. 534, 356
S.E.2d 578, 586-87 (1987) .
3.

Did the trial court err in concluding that Park's

counterclaim did not state a claim upon which relief could be
granted?
- 1 -

The Court will affirm a dismissal for failure to state
a claim only if it clearly appears that the claimant can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim.

Colman v. Utah State

Land Board, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1990).

In making this

determination the appellate court must accept the material allegations of the claimant's pleading as true, construe the pleading
in the light most favorable to the claimant and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor.

Id.; Arrow Indus., Inc. v.

Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988).
4.

Did the trial court err in awarding Olson attor-

ney fees incurred in the present action as well as in the earlier
action of First Security Bank v. Park-Craiq-Olson, Inc.?
This is a question of law, which the Court reviews
for correctness.

See Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah

1989).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
The plaintiff, H. Glenn Olson, brought this action

seeking indemnity from defendant Park-Craig-Olson, Inc. and contribution from defendants J. Samuel Park and Ellis Edward Craig
for amounts he paid to First Security Bank as a co-guarantor
on certain notes.

Defendant Park counterclaimed against Olson

for unreimbursed expenditures he advanced and services he per- 2 -

formed in obtaining releases of other obligations that Olson
had guaranteed.

The trial court dismissed Park's counterclaim

and entered summary judgment in favor of Olson. Park-Craig-Olson,
Inc. and Park have appealed the trial court's Order Dismissing
Counterclaim of J. Samuel Park; Summary Judgment Against ParkCraig-Olson, Inc. and J. Samuel Park; and Order Denying Objections
to Proposed Orders.
B.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Defendant Park-Craig-Olson, Inc. ("PCO") was at

all relevant times a Utah corporation. Except for the period from
January 1985 through September 1987, defendant J. Samuel Park held
54.33 percent of the outstanding shares of the corporation.

At

all relevant times defendant Ellis Edward Craig owned 29 percent
and the plaintiff, H. Glenn Olson, owned 16.67 percent of the outstanding shares of the corporation.

Record ("R.") at 240-41 5

2.
2.

PCO owned and operated six Marie Callender rest-

aurants—one in Arcadia, California, and five in Utah (on Foothill
Drive in Salt Lake City, on 3900 South in Salt Lake City, in
Bountiful, in Midvale and in West Valley City).
3.

Ici. at 241 f 3.

In operating the restaurants, PCO incurred certain

debts, including obligations on two notes to First Security Bank
(the "Bank").

The first note, dated November 17, 1981, was for

the principal amount of $215,000.00.
- 3 -

The second note, dated

January 6, 1983, was in the principal amount of $225,000.00,
Id. at 243-44 I 7; 103 I 3; 117; 120.
4.

PCO was also obligated under real estate leases

for each of its six locations, id. at 245 5 8.
5.

By separate instruments, Park, Craig and Olson

each personally guaranteed PCO's indebtedness to the Bank.
The personal liability of each guarantor was limited to $550,000.
Id. at 103 1 4; 124-26.
6.

Park, Craig and Olson also personally guaranteed

certain other obligations of PCO, including the leases for the
West Valley City, Bountiful and Foothill Drive stores and two
master franchise agreements with Marie Callender Pie Shops, Inc.
Olson personally guaranteed a renewal lease on the Arcadia store
for which Park was not a guarantor.
7.

Id. at 245-46; 403 I 11.

On January 30, 1985, defendant Park sold his shares

in PCO to a group of investors known as the Marsh Group. Id. at
242 f 4.
8.

In the summer of 1987, the Marsh Group defaulted

on its payments to Park.

At this time Park learned that the

restaurants owned and operated by PCO were in serious financial
trouble, threatening the investment of PCO's shareholders, including Mr. Olson.

Ld. at 243 I 6.

- 4 -

9.

PCO defaulted on its payments to the Bank, and in

June 1987 the Bank sued PCO and Park, Craig and Olson, as
guarantors on the notes. Id. at 107-16.
10.

In September 1987, Park repossessed his shares in

PCO from the Marsh Group.
11.

Id. at 243 I 6; 400 I 7.

From August 1987 through June 1988 Park personally

expended his own time and money to try to save PCO's restaurants.
He negotiated with creditors, sought sources to refinance PCO's
debts, and sought buyers for PCO's assets. Id. at 247-49.
12.

Despite the fact that Olson was a shareholder of

PCO and was personally liable as guarantor on several of PCO's
obligations, Olson did not assist in any of these efforts and
refused to participate in any negotiations with creditors or to
contribute any funds to the work-out efforts. Id. at 248 f 13.
13.

Through Park's efforts and expenditure of funds,

Olson was released from his liability as guarantor on the leases
of the West Valley City, Bountiful, Foothill Drive and Arcadia
stores, either directly or through cancellation of the underlying
obligations. The landlord of the West Valley City store, however,
insisted that Park remain personally liable as a guarantor on
that lease, which he did.
14.

Id. at 250-52.

At the time Olson was released from his guaranty

of the West Valley City lease, the lease had a remaining term of
nineteen years at the rate of the greater of $6,424.50 or 5.5
- 5 -

percent of gross sales per month, for a minimum total remaining
obligation of $1,464,786.00.

The West Valley City location was

the least profitable of all the PCO locations and was incurring
average net operating losses of $15,000.00 per month, including
the lease payment.
15.
a

guarantor

Id. at 251 I 15(a).

At the time Olson was released from liability as
of the

lease on the Arcadia store, there was

$91,948.07 in accrued and unpaid percentage rent due under that
lease.

Jd. at 407 I 17(b).

Arcadia lease.
16.

Park was not a guarantor of the

JId. at 245-46 1 8(e).
At the time Olson was released from liability as

a guarantor of the lease on the Foothill Drive store, there was
$70,935.18 in accrued and unpaid percentage rent due under that
lease.

Id. at 408 1 17(c).
17.

At the time Olson was released from liability as

a guarantor of the lease on the Bountiful store, the lease had
a remaining term of 208 months at the rate of $4,420.00 per month,
for a total remaining liability of $919,360.00.

The Bountiful

location was historically unprofitable and was eventually closed
because of poor performance.
18.

Id. at 252 I 15(d).

A significant part of Park's efforts was also ex-

pended negotiating the release of the guarantors on the two franchise agreements with Marie Callender Pie Shops, Inc.— with
respect to the Arcadia and Foothill Drive stores. Through Park's
- 6 -
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and, under his second claim, contribution from Park and Craig.
Id. at 2-7.
25.

Park counterclaimed against Olson, seeking payment

for monies he advanced and services he performed to rescue PCO
and to obtain releases of PCO's obligations that Olson had personally guaranteed.
26.

Id. at 397-411.

The trial court dismissed Park's counterclaim,

granted summary judgment in favor of Olson and against all defendants, and denied the defendants' objections to the form of the
orders.

Id. at 482-83; 528-30; 592-94; 605-08; 612-14; 615-18.

The judgment against PCO included an award of $2,500.00 for attorney fees incurred in this action.

Id. at 616 5 C.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Park and Olson were co-guarantors of PCO's debt to
the Bank.

Olson was only entitled to contribution from Park if

Olson paid more than his proportionate share of PCO's debt and
Park did not pay his proportionate share. Neither condition was
met in this case. The trial court erred in concluding that Olson
was entitled to contribution from Park because Park had paid
more than his share of PCO's debt (point I-A) and Olson did not
pay more than his share (point I-B).
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Nowhere in the record does it state the entire amount
owing to the Bank on April 15, 1988, the date Olson made the
payment for which he seeks contribution.

For this reason alone,

the trial court erred in granting Olson's motion for summary
judgment against Park because, without knowing the entire amount
of the debt, the trial court could not say as a matter of law
that Olson had paid more than his proportionate share of the
debt—a prerequisite to Olson's claim for contribution.

Never-

theless, assuming that PCO's total liability was the total amount
paid to the Bank on PCO's debts, the total liability would have
been $319,307.65 (the $235,000 paid by Park plus the $84,307.65
paid by Olson).

Assuming further that Olson is correct in ar-

guing that the co-guarantors' proportionate share of liability
should have been based on their respective percentage of ownership
in PCO (a proposition Park disputes, see infra, part I-B), Olson
was still not entitled to contribution from Park.
The law is clear that, where one guarantor pays less
than the entire debt owed by the principal but more than his
share, he can recover from any co-guarantor who has not paid his
share "such excess up to the amount of the unpaid share of the
other . . . ." Restatement of Restitution § 85 comment e (1936).
Olson's payment was clearly less than the entire amount that
PCO owed the Bank.

Thus, he was only entitled to contribution

from Park if Park had not paid his share of the debt.
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^

or where, by the terms of their contracts of guaranty, they provide that each shall be jointly and severally liable and that
each shall bear an equal proportion of the obligation, see 38
Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty § 128; Curtis v. Cichon, 462 So.2d 104,
106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Park, Craig and Olson each guaranteed PCO's indebtedness to the Bank up to $550,000, and each
was jointly and severally liable.

R. at 124-26.

The fact that

they were all equally liable to the Bank (up to $550,000 each)
shows that they in fact intended to bear equally any liability
to the Bank.
The common law rule of equal contribution holds true
even if the loan is on behalf of a corporation and the guarantors
are shareholders of the corporation whose ownership interests
in the corporation are not equal.

Curtis, 462 So.2d at 106;

Brill v. Swanson. 36 Wash. App. 396, 674 P.2d 211, 212-13 (1984);
Miller v. Miles, 400 S.W.2d at 7. This is because the guarantors'
liability in such a case arises from the guaranty agreement,
not from their status as stockholders.

Curtis, 462 So.2d at

105; 13A C. Thompson, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations § 6219 at 35 (rev. perm. ed. 1984). Park, for example, remained personally liable on his guaranty even after he
severed his relationship with PCO in January 1985 and was not a
shareholder in PCO in June 1987, when the Bank sued him on his
guaranty.
- 12 -
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because his and Park's ownership of stock in PCO was unequal,
the exception applies and each should be liable in proportion
to his shares of stock in PCO.

Apart from the fact that other

courts have rejected similar arguments, see, e.g.f Curtis, 462
So.2d at 105-06; Miller, 400 S.W.2d at 7-5; Brill, 674 P.2d at
213, Olson has failed in his burden of proving that the benefits he and Park received from their common obligation were unequal .
The record shows that the Bank's first loan to PCO was
made on November 17, 1981, and was for a period of five years.
R. at 10.

The Bank's second loan was made on January 6, 1983,

and was also for a period of five years.

.Id. at 13.

PCO de-

faulted on the loans some time before May 26, 1987. Jd. at 1215.

Although Park was a stockholder of PCO when the loans were

made and the guarantees given, he sold his stock in PCO in January
1985 and did not repossess it until September 1987, after PCO
defaulted on the loans and the Bank brought its action.
242 & 246.

Id. at

Park remained personally liable as a guarantor on

the obligations throughout this period but, because he had sold
his PCO shares, did not receive any benefit from the loans after
January 1985.

Thus, there was a period of over two years in

which Park received no benefit from the common obligations to
the Bank while Olson, as a stockholder in PCO, did receive a benefit.

The trial court erred in requiring Park to pay a dispro- 14 -
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at 617.

Even if Olson were otherwise correct in arguing that

Park's and Craig's liability for contribution should be based
on the parties' respective percentages of stock ownership in
PCO, the principal obligor, the trial court applied the wrong
measure of damages,
A co-guarantor has a right to contribution only after
he has paid more than his proportionate share of the entire debt
and can be reimbursed only for amounts he paid in excess of his
proportionate share.

See Gardner v. Bean, 677 P. 2d 1116, 1118

(Utah 1984); Restatement of Security § 154 comments c, d & £;
18 Am Jur. 2d Contribution § 24. In determining the plaintiff's
proportionate share in a case such as this, the court must consider the amount owed and not the amount paid in settlement.
Sacks v. Tavss, 237 Va. 13, 375 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1989).

Even

if Olson were correct that his proportionate share was 16.67
percent

(his percentage ownership in PCO), his proportionate

share of the total debt would be $53,228.59 (16.67 percent of
$319,307.65). He is only entitled to contribution for the amount
he paid in excess of his proportionate share, or in other words,
for $31,079.06 ($84,307.65 minus $53,228.59). This amount alone
is less than the judgment against Park.

But Park would only be

liable for his proportionate share of this amount. Using Olson's
theory of proportionality, as between Park and Craig, Olson's
co-obligers, Park's share of the overpayment would be 65.2 percent
- 16 -
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rnE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PARK'S COUNTERCLAIM
DID NOT STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED.
A*

Park's Counterclaim Should Not Have Btten Dismissed If
the Facts Alleged Would Entitle Him to Relief Under Any
Legal Theory.
The trial court dismissed Park's countexclaim, on the

grounds that it failed tn state a claim on which relief could be
granted.

See R, ml .1,1,', -It).1 -1,1 I
A dismissal Is a severe measure and should not have been

giant:pel nu'lt^ss \t

wnr. clear that Park was not

entitled to relief

under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his
claim. See, e.g. , Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 132 Utah Adv.
Rep. 3, 3-4 (Utah 1990); Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l
Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988).

"The courts are a forum for

settling controversies, and if there is any doubt about whether
a claim should be dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, the
issue should be resolved in favor of giving the party an opportunity to present its proof."

Colman, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. at

4.
In reviewing the dismissal of Park's counterclaim, the
Court must accept the material allegations of the counterclaim
as true and must construe the counterclaim in the light most
favorable to Park and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.
Id. ; Arrow Indus. , 767 P. 2d at 936. As discussed below, Park has
set forth facts which establish a claim for relief under a theory
of quantum meruit.
B.

Park Has Set Forth Facts Which Establish a Claim for
Relief in Quantum Meruit.
Quantum meruit allows recovery for labor performed in

a variety of circumstances in which the claiming party would not
be able to sue on an express contract. Davis v. Olson, 746 P.2d
264, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

The purpose of allowing recovery

under the theory of quantum meruit is to prevent the defendant's
enrichment at the plaintiff's expense.

- 18 -

.Id. at 269.

Quantum meruit has two distinct branches.

The first

branch consists of contracts implied in law (also known as quasicontract or unjust enrichment), the elements of which are: "(1)
the defendant received a benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge
by the defendant of the benefit; (3) under circumstances that
would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit
without paying for it." Id. The second branch consists of contracts implied in fact, the elements of which are:

(1) the de-

fendant requested the plaintiff to do the work; (2) the plaintiff
expected the defendant to compensate him for his services; and
(3) the defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff
expected compensation.

Id.

As neither party has claimed the

existence of an "implied in fact" contract based on conduct,
Park will concentrate only upon the first branch of quantum
meruit, namely, contract implied in law (quasi-contract or unjust
enrichment).
A quasi-contractual relation is one that is "created
by the law for reasons of justice, without any expression of
assent and sometimes even against a clear expression of dissent."
See 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 19 at 46 (1963).

Consi-

derations of equity and morality play a large part in finding a
quasi-contract.

Id,

- 19 -

Park's counterclaim states a claim upon which relief
can be granted since all three elements of a claim for quasicontractual relief are pled and each is supported by the record.
1.

Olson Received a Benefit.

A person confers a benefit upon another if he gives the
other some interest in money, land or possessions, performs services beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies a
debt of the other or in any way adds to the other's advantage.
Restatement of Restitution § 1, comment b. The facts in the record
establish that Park conferred a benefit on Olson by securing
his release from literally millions of dollars' worth of potential
liability as a personal guarantor on four leases and two franchise
agreements: the leases on the West Valley City, Bountiful, Arcadia
and Foothill Drive stores and the franchise agreements with respect to the Arcadia and Foothill Drive stores. These obligations
represented some $2.8 million in potential liability for Olson.
Cf. Sparks v. Gustafson, 750 P.2d 338, 342 (Alaska 1988) (plaintiff's services by which he kept the defendant's business operating and paid its debts conferred a benefit on the defendant).
Olson himself admitted in his deposition that Park's
services and efforts in obtaining the releases of the guarantees
were of value to him:
Q.

(By Mr. Shields) Let me represent to you
that you have, in fact, been released
from your guarantees on the West Valley
and Bountiful leases. Assuming that
- 20 -

representation to be true, obtaining
those releases was of value to you,
was it not, in terms of forgiving your
guarantee obligation?
A.

Yes.

Olson Deposition at p. 43, lines 12-18.2
2.

Olson Had an Appreciation or Knowledge of the Benefit.

From the record, one can reasonably infer that Olson
knew of the benefit that he received from Park's efforts. Olson
knew that he was obligated as a guarantor on the notes to the
Bank, on the leases and on the franchise agreements because he
was a party to those guarantees.

See R. at 401-03 If 9-11.

Olson knew that PCO was in dire financial straits as early as
February 19, 1987, when he telephoned defendant Craig and proposed
that they, as minority stockholders, sue Park and two successive
management groups.

See id. at 512 5 4. Moreover, Olson investi-

gated PCO's financial affairs in June 1987, when he contacted
an officer of First Security Bank.

Olson Deposition at 35.

Olson knew that Park was trying to negotiate compromises with
creditors, a sale of PCO's assets and a release of their guaranty
obligations because Park asked him "to participate in the negotiations or to help in any way, either financially or in person,"
but Olson refused.

R. at 254 f 15(f) & 248 I 13. Finally, Olson

1

The cited portions of Olson's deposition are reproduced
in the Addendum.
- 21 -

and his counsel had an opportunity to review the proposed agreement for the sale of PCO's assets to Marie Callender Ventures,
Inc. before the sale took place and knew or should have known
that, as a result of the sale that was negotiated by Park, Olson
would be released from his personal guarantees on the Bountiful
and West Valley City store leases•
ex. 6.

Olson Deposition at 44-45 &

From all of these facts, one can conclude that Olson

knew of the benefit he received from Park's efforts.
3.

The Circumstances Surrounding the Benefit Conferred
on Olson Made It Unjust for Him to Retain the
Benefit Without Paying for It.

It is clear from the allegations of the counterclaim
that Olson refused to participate in the negotiations which saved
PCO from ruin.

Without Park's substantial efforts in obtaining

a buyer, Olson would have been subject to joint and several liability on the four real estate leases and the two franchise
agreements.

Park's services resulted in the release of Olson

as a personal guarantor on over a million dollars' worth of current or potential liabilities.

Park repeatedly asked Olson to

participate in the negotiations with creditors and potential
buyers and to contribute to the transactions that were necessary to save PCO from ruin, but Olson refused to participate in
any way. Yet, when Park's efforts resulted in releases of Olson
from personal liability on the four real estate leases and the
two franchise agreements, Olson readily accepted the fruits of
- 22 -

Park's labors.

Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for

Olson to retain the benefit of Park's services without paying
for them.
This case is similar to Sparks v. Gustafson, 750 P.2d
338 (Alaska 1988).

The plaintiff in that case performed manage-

ment services that kept the defendant's business operating, paid
its debts and made substantial repairs and improvements to its
property.

750 P. 2d at 342.

The court held that it would be

just to require the defendant to compensate the plaintiff because
the plaintiff's services were of the type for which one would
ordinarily expect to be paid and benefited the defendant (although
they may also have benefited the plaintiff).

See id. at 343.

Similarly, Park's extensive efforts to save PCO by negotiating
with and paying off creditors were the sort for which one would
ordinarily expect to be paid, and Park in fact asked Olson to
contribute to these efforts, "either financially or in person."
R. at 254 5 15(f).

Park's efforts clearly benefited Olson, and

he accepted and retained that benefit. Under the circumstances,
it would be inequitable to allow him to retain the benefit without
paying for it.
Olson argued below, however, that his retention of the
benefit of Park's services was not inequitable because Park performed the services for his own advantage, making any benefit to
Olson "incidental."
- 23 -

Olson relies for his position on Berrett v. Stevens,
690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984)-

The plaintiffs in that case sold real

property to the defendants under contract.

The defendants gave

Murray First Thrift (MFT) a mortgage on the property to secure
a loan for improvements.

To insure repayment of the loan, MFT

required the defendants to obtain credit life insurance policies.
One of the buyers died, and a dispute arose over the amount due
under the life insurance policy.

At the same time, the defen-

dants became delinquent in their payments to the plaintiffs under
the real estate contract.

The plaintiffs agreed to accept a

deed from the defendants in lieu of foreclosure and to assume
the obligation to MFT.

The plaintiffs further agreed that, if

the defendants' claim for additional insurance proceeds was resolved in their favor and the "disputed amount" was either applied against the loan from MFT or paid directly to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs would pay "said same amount" to the defendants.

At the time the parties entered into this agreement,

the defendants were claiming an additional $10,000.00 in insurance
proceeds.
$20,000.00.

The insurance company eventually paid an additional
The plaintiffs paid the defendants $10,000.00 of

this amount and applied the rest to the defendants' obligation
to MFT, which the plaintiffs had assumed.

The defendants, how-

ever, claimed that they were entitled to the entire $20,000.00.

- 24 -

The court concluded that there was "little doubt that
plaintiffs did receive some benefit" from the defendants' efforts
in making the claim for additional insurance proceeds and pursuing
negotiations with MFT and the insurance company.
557.

690 P. 2d at

"However," the court continued, "the mere fact that a person

benefits another is not by itself sufficient to require the other
to make restitution. The value of services performed by a person
for his own advantage and from which another benefits incidentally
are not recoverable." Id. at 557-58 (footnotes omitted). 3 Olson
relies on this language for his argument that Park failed to state
a claim for unjust enrichment. Olson argues that Park performed
the services for his own advantage, so any benefit to Olson must
have been incidental.
Olson is wrong on both counts.

Park's services were

not performed for his own advantage, and any benefit to Olson was
not "incidental."
Park's services were meant to save PCO from financial
ruin.

Park first advanced money to save PCO in August 1987.

At that time, Park was not even a stockholder of PCO.

(He repos-

3
Berrett did not establish a new element for a claim
for unjust enrichment. The party making such a claim does not
need to prove that the services he performed were not incidental.
Rather, whether or not the services were performed for his own
advantage and whether or not any benefit to the other party was
incidental are simply factors the court may consider in determining whether retention of the benefit without payment would
be inequitable under the circumstances. See 690 P.2d at 55758.
- 25 -

sessed his PCO shares from the Marsh Group in September 1987.)
See R. at 404 f 14 & 403 f 13. Olson, on the other hand, was a
shareholder of PCO throughout the relevant time.

More impor-

tantly, with respect to two of the obligations, Park's efforts
to secure Olson's release from personal liability did not result
in any corresponding benefit to Park.

First, Park secured

Olson's release from liability as a guarantor on the lease of
the Arcadia store, even though Park was not a guarantor on that
lease and thus was not personally liable on that obligation, as
Olson was.

Second, through Park's sole efforts the landlord of

the West Valley City store was persuaded to release Olson as a
guarantor on that lease but insisted that Park remain personally
liable as a guarantor on the lease, which he did.

One can

hardly say that Park performed that service for his own advantage
where he remained personally liable for a lease obligation of
$1,464,786 and Olson emerged with absolutely no personal liability
whatsoever.

Thus, Park's services were performed for PCO's ad-

vantage, not Park's, and benefited Olson in ways Park was not
benefited.
Moreover, any benefit to Olson was not "incidental."
"Incidental" means "occurring merely by chance or without intention or calculation."

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 580

(1977). Park spent a significant part of his efforts to save the
PCO enterprise in negotiating the release of Olson from the four
- 26 -

leases and two franchise agreements.

R. at 406-08 II 17 & 18.

One can infer from this that the release of Olson from his personal liability on those obligations did not occur "merely by
chance or without intention or calculation."

In this regard,

this case is distinguishable from Berrett, the case Olson relies
on. The benefit in that case "was clearly unanticipated by either
of the parties."

690 P. 2d at 557 (quoting the trial court's

memorandum decision).

Moreover, Berrett involved an express

contract that clearly limited the plaintiffs' liability.

See

690 P. 2d at 557. In the present case there is no explicit limitation based on an express contract, and the benefit conferred
on Olson was clearly not "incidental."
Park's extensive services, rendered in the face of
Olson's refusal to involve himself in the affairs of the corporation, directly resulted in the release of Olson from over a
million dollars' worth of personal guarantees.

Olson himself,

in his deposition, admitted that those services were of value to
him; certainly, these are "circumstances that would make it unjust
for the [plaintiff] to retain the benefit without paying for
it."

Berrett, 690 P.2d at 557.
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IV,

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING OLSON ATTORNEY FEES
INCURRED IN THIS ACTION AS WELL AS IN THE EARLIER ACTION OF
FIRST SECURITY BANK V. PARK-CRAIG-OLSON, INC.
A guarantor who has paid the principal obligation is

entitled to reimbursement from the principal debtor. See, e.g. ,
Western Coach Corp. v. Roscoe, 133 Ariz. 147, 650 P.2d 449, 453
(1982); Restatement of Restitution §§ 76 & 80. If the guarantor
became a surety on the principal obligation with the consent or
because of the fault of the principal debtor, he is entitled to
reimbursement for all expenses reasonably incurred by him in
connection with the obligation.
80 & comment d.

Restatement of Restitution §

The record in this case is silent as to whether

or not Olson became a guarantor with the consent or because of
the fault of PCO.

If he voluntarily became surety for PCO with-

out PCO's consent or fault, he is only entitled to reimbursement
to the extent that his payment to the Bank diminished the debt
of PCO.

Id. comment c.

Because Olson failed to show that he

became a guarantor with PCO's consent or fault, he is entitled
to be reimbursed only for the payment he made on PCO's debt and
not for any attorney fees incurred in the Bank's action against
him, since the latter did not diminish PCO's debt to the Bank.
Moreover, Olson is not entitled to be reimbursed for
his attorney fees in this action.

In Utah, attorney fees may

be awarded only if provided by statute or contract.

The only

statute that Olson relied on in the trial court—Utah Code Ann.
- 28 -

§ 7 0A-3-415(5)—is inapplicable.

That statute states, "An ac-

commodation party is not liable to the party accommodated, and
if he pays the instrument has a right of recourse on the instrument against such party."

The statute defines "accommodation

party" as "one who signs the instrument . . . for the purpose
of lending his name to another party to it."

Utah Code Ann. §

70A-3-415(l) (emphasis added). Olson did not sign the instruments
that he claims give him his right to attorney fees, namely, PCO's
notes to the Bank. Thus, he is not an accommodation party within
the meaning of the statute. Cf.. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Watts, 737 P.2d 154, 158-59 (Utah 1987) (an accommodation party
is one who signs the note as a surety); First Nat'l Bank of Lavton
v. Egbert, 663 P.2d 85, 86 (Utah 1983) (cosigners of notes were
accommodation parties).
Moreover, there is no contract between Olson and PCO
entitling Olson to recover his attorney fees incurred in this
action.

Under the circumstances, the general rule applies,

namely, that an indemnitee cannot recover his attorney fees incurred in establishing his right to indemnification. See, e.g. ,
Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443, 450 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988); Peter Fabrics, Inc. v. S.S. "Hermes", 765 F.2d
306, 316 (2d Cir. 1985); Chetopa State Bancshares, Inc. v. Fox,
6 Kan. App. 2d 326, 628 P.2d 249, 256 (1981). The reason for this
rule is that costs incurred in establishing the existence of an
- 29 -

obligation to indemnify are costs incurred for breach of an
implied contract to indemnify and thus "fall within the ordinary
rule requiring a party to bear his own expenses of litigation."
Peter Fabrics, Inc., 765 F.2d at 316 (citation omitted).
For these reasons, the trial court erred in awarding
Olson his attorney fees incurred in this and the earlier action
of First Security Bank v. Park-Craiq-Olson, Inc., et al.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed in part I, supra, the Court
should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment against
Park on Olson's second claim for relief and remand this case to
the district court for entry of judgment in favor of Park.

At

a minimum, for the reasons discussed in part II, supra, the case
should be remanded so that the amount of the judgment against
Park can be corrected.
For the reasons discussed in part III, supra, this
Court should reverse the dismissal of Park's counterclaim and
remand this action to the trial court to allow that claim to be
decided on its merits.
On Olson's first claim for relief, the Court should
reverse that part of the judgment awarding Olson his attorney's
fees and remand this action to the district court for entry of
a modified judgment in favor of Olson.
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NOW
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ALL RIGHT.
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RELEASED FROM YOUR PERSONAL GUARANTEES ON THE LEASES ON
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BOUNTIFUL AND WEST VALLEY?
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NO.

6

Q

ALL RIGHT.

7

A

NO.

8

Q

PRIOR TO THIS OCCASION TODAY, DID YOU EVER WONDER

9
10

DO YOU KNOW THAT NOW?

WHAT WAS HAPPENING WITH THE WEST VALLEY LEASE IN TERMS OF
THE FACT THAT YOU MAY BE CALLED ON TO PAY ON YOUR GUARANTEE?

H

A

NO.

12

Q

LET ME REPRESENT TO YOU THAT YOU HAVE, IN FACT,
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BEEN RELEASED FROM YOUR GUARANTEES ON THE WEST VALLEY AND
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BOUNTIFUL LEASES.
ASSUMING THAT REPRESENTATION TO BE TRUE, OBTAINING

15

16

THOSE RELEASES WAS OF VALUE TO YOU, WAS IT NOT, IN TERMS OF

17

FORGIVING YOUR GUARANTEE OBLIGATION?

18
19
20

A

Q

YES

-

AND THE VALUE WOULD BE, WOULD IT NOT, THE REMAINING

AMOUNT OF THE LEASE OBLIGATION?

21

A

I DON'T UNDERSTAND YOUR QUESTION.

22

Q

WELL, MY QUESTION IS, UNDER BOTH OF THOSE LEASES,

23

AT THE TIME THAT YOUR GUARANTEE WAS RELEASED, THERE WERE

24

SEVERAL YEARS STILL YET TO GO ON BOTH OF THEM.

25
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DO YOU HAVE

EXAM BY SHIELDS

A

I'M NOT AWARE OF IT.

Q

ALL RIGHT.

AND YOU WERE A JOINT PERSONAL GUARANTOR

ON BOTH OF THOSE LEASES, CORRECT?
A

OKAY.

Q

OKAY.

SO BUT FOR THOSE RELEASES, YOU WOULD HAVE

HAD A CONTINGENT OBLIGATION TO SATISFY THOSE, WOULD YOU NOT?
A

WELL, I WAS ASSUMING THAT WHEN SAM SOLD OUT, THAT

WHOEVER BOUGHT THE STORES WOULD HAVE ASSUMED ALL THOSE
LEASES.
Q

AND THEY DID.

LET ME REPRESENT TO YOU THAT THEY

A

OKAY.

Q

MR. OLSON, LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT I'LL HAVE MARKED

DID.

AS EXHIBIT 6.
(WHEREUPON, DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NO. 6 WAS
MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
Q

(BY MR. SHIELDS)

THIS IS A LETTER DATED JUNE 21,

1988, FROM YOUR COUNSEL TO MY CO-COUNSEL IN THIS CASE,
MR. ARMSTRONG.

HAVE YOU EVER SEEN THIS LETTER BEFORE?

A

YES.

Q

ALL RIGHT, LOOKING AT THE CARBON COPY INDICATIONS.

MR. OLSON, THAT LETTER INDICATES THAT YOU OR YOUR LEGAL
COUNSEL RECEIVED NOTICE OF A MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS IN THE
CORPORATION SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 22, I BELIEVE, RIGHT ON THE
FIRST PAGE, CONCERNING VOTING ON THE SALE TO MARIE CALLENDER'S

4*4

EXAM BY SHI ELDS

VENTURES OWNED BY RAMADA.
IS THAT YOUR RECOLLECTION, THAT YOU HAD NOTICE
OF THAT MEETING PRIOR TO IT OCCURRING?

AS A MATTER OF FACT,

I BELIEVE IT TALKS ABOUT IT IN THE VERY FIRST PARAGRAPH OF
THE LETTER.
A

WELL, WHATEVER'S INCLUDED IN THE LETTER.

THE

LETTER SPEAKS FOR ITSELF.
Q

ALL RIGHT.

WELL, THE REASON I ASKED THAT IS THIS

LETTER IS NOT FROM YOU, IT'S FROM YOUR LEGAL COUNSEL, AND
P M JUST MAKING SURE THAT YOU WERE AWARE OF THE INFORMATION
CONTAINED IN THE LETTER.

I GUESS WHAT YOUfRE TELLING ME IS

THAT YOU WERE.
MR. PANZER:

LET ME CLARIFY YOUR QUESTION, JEFF.

ARE YOU STILL TALKING JUST ABOUT THE SPECIAL MEETING OF
SHAREHOLDERS?
MR. SHIELDS:
Q

YES.

(BY MR. SHIELDS)

I'M TRYING TO ASK, MR. OLSON,

WHETHER YOU PERSONALLY EVER HAD NOTICE OF THAT MEETING PRIOR
TO THE DATE IT WAS SCHEDULED FOR, THAT BEING JUNE 22.
A

I DON'T RECALL.

Q

ALL RIGHT.

THAT MEETING.

AS I UNDERSTAND IT, YOU DID NOT ATTEND

IS THAT CORRECT?

A

I DON'T RECALL.

Q

SO YOUR TESTIMONY IS THAT YOU DON'T KNOW WHETHER

YOU WENT OR YOU DIDN'T GO?
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June 21, 1988
Hand Delivered
Brent R. Armstrong
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
RE:

DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT

£

H. Glenn Olson/Park-Craig-Olson, Inc.
Special Meeting of Shareholders set for June 22, 1988

Dear Brent:
We have now had an opportunity to meet with our client,
Glenn Olson, regarding the above-referenced special meeting of
shareholders and the subject matter thereof, i.e., the sale of
the assets of PCO to Marie Callender Ventures, Inc. Mr. Olson
wishes to advise the company and Sam Park that generally he does
not object to a sale of the assets of PCO, and does not wish to
exercise any dissenter's rights available under Utah Code Ann.
§§ 16-10-75 and -76. On behalf of Mr. Olson, we would, however,
like to express the following concerns and objections to the
sale as proposed in the Asset Sales Agreement, a draft of which
was furnished to us, and the proposed disbursement of the sale
proceeds.
As you are well aware, it is the opinion of Mr. Olson that
hundreds of thousands of dollars were wrongfully paid by PCO to
Sam Park, Doug Powelson, the L.D.S. Church, and Merrill Lynch
Private Capital, from and after the date Mr. Park sold his stock
in PCO to the Marsh group. Because of the state of the records,
and, in particular, the commingling of bank accounts and financial
records (which, incidentally, appears to have continued to date),
it is difficult to tell the exact nature and extent of the payments
It is perfectly clear, however, that Sam Park, Doug Powelson, and
Merrill Lynch Private Capital group had complete knowledge that
PCO was making the payments, even though the true indebtedness
was that of the Marsh group. In fact, it is reported to us
that Sam Park specifically requested the bookkeeper to set up
the balance due him as a note payable on PCO's records.

Brent R. Armstrong
June 21, 1988
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In short, Mr. Olson is of the opinion that PCO has substantial
claims against Sam Park, Doug Powelson, the L.D.S. Church and
Merrill Lynch Private Capital on account of these monies. Each
payment would, under the circumstances, be a fraudulent conveyance
or otherwise recoverable under applicable law. Despite this
knowledge, Mr. Park, as controlling shareholder of PCO since last
fall, has made no attempt to recover the fraudulent conveyances.
We believe the money wrongfully paid to these individuals and
entities were a proximate cause of the apparent failure of the
business. Obviously, other factors enter into this, most noteably
the large amounts of money apparently withdrawn by MacArthur and
Marsh. Mr. Park is not, however, without blame. In addition,
there are the potential claims we have discussed regarding liability
of Mr. Park for the sale of the controlling interest in the corporation to the Marsh group. At this time, we do not know the
extent of Mr. Park's knowledge of the financial arrangements
between Marsh and Merrill Lynch Private Capital or whoever else
financed the purchase; however, we suspect that Mr. Park was
fully aware of such arrangements and the likelihood that PCO
assets would be used to repay the Marsh indebtedness, essentially
making the transaction a leveraged buyout (but without buying out
the minority shareholders).
It has been impossible for Mr. Olson to analyze the financial
aspects of the proposed sale of PCO assets, primarily because the
assets have been lumped together with Sam Park's other stores and
are being sold as a group. It is not possible to determine the
consideration being paid for the PCO as opposed to non PCO stores.
Accordingly, although the transaction may be considered fair if
between a single buyer and seller, it is not possible to determine
whether, for example, Marie Callender Ventures is assuming debts
of Sam Park stores in consideration for the purchase of PCO stores.
The proposed Asset Sales Agreement also appropriates to
Sam Park apparent PCO opportunities, by providing for a payment
to Sam Park of 50% of any negotiated decreases in "old debt."
See Exhibit C, paragraph (h). There is also a $25,000 cash payment
to Mr. Park that is unexplained.
Mr. Park is also to receive $560,000 on account of alleged
loans to PCO. Although represented to us that this is only a
portion of the amounts he has advanced, it is not at all clear
that that is correct. If Mr. Park advanced monies to his other
stores, which he owns personally, it could hardly be said that
he is owed money by himself. We were advised that he advanced
approximately $560,000 to PCO, but do not know the truth of that
representation.
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As you are aware, Mr. Olson paid $84,307.65 to First Security
Bank on account of debts owed by PCO. To that extent at least,
Mr. Olson is a direct creditor of PCO; however, this debt is
apparently not disclosed and is certainly not paid as a consequence
of the sale. Instead, we understand that Mr. Park, who supposedly
advanced $235,000 to pay off the remainder of the First Security
debts, intends to take the full amount of his advance out of the
sale proceeds. We do not have any idea how this disparate treatment can be justified, except on the fact that Sam Park owns a
controlling interest in the corporation.
We request that the company add to proposed Exhibit "D",
Excluded Assets, claims against Doug Powelson, Merrill Lynch
Private Capital, J. Samuel Park, and Ann Park.
While the proposed sale appears to be an arms length transaction, and it appears Marie Callender Ventures is, viewed as a
whole, paying a fair consideration, it is not possible to determine
whether a fair consideration is being received by PCO. Mr. Olson
objects to the proposed disbursement of sale proceeds. First, it
is our contention that Mr. Park is not owed anything by PCO. Any
funds he put into PCO since last fall were, in our opinion, merely
repayments of fraudulent conveyances. Secondly, Mr. Park is, to
the extent he receives payment on account of a reduction of debt
by negotiation, misappropriating a corporate opportunity. Thirdly,
Mr. Olson should, at a bear minimum, receive payment on account of
the First Security loan to the same extent Mr. Park receives payment. If Mr. Park is going to be repaid in full, Mr. Olson should
also be paid in full.
In closing, we wish to advise you that absent a fair and
reasonable settlement with Mr. Olson on account of his claims and
the claims of PCO against Mr. Park and others, it is the intention
of Mr. Olson to forthwith initiate a lawsuit. It is likely that
a derivative action will also be brought, since many of the claims
against Mr. Park are, at first blush, property of PCO. To the
extent a demand is necessary, please consider this letter a demand
that the company initiate actions against Mr. Park, Doug Powelson,
and Merrill Lynch Private Capital to recover fraudulent conveyances and assert other claims against the individuals and entities.
We presume, however, that no such actions will be brought because
of Mr. Park's majority ownership of the stock of PCO.
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Mr. feaic does not intend to attend the special meeting of
the shareholders.
Very truly yours,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

BDP/sw
cc: Glenn Olson
Reed Martineau

